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COMMENTS ON PROPOSAL FOR STRUCTURING
JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN SENTENCING
Paul H. Robinson*
 אחד מחוקרי המשפט הפלילי החשובי בארצות הברית,פרופ' פול רובינסו
(92 ' נענה להזמנתנו להתייחס להצעת חוק העונשי )תיקו מס,ומחוצה לה
 ולהעיר הערותיו2006– התשס"ו,()הבניית שיקול הדעת השיפוטי בענישה
, כהולכת בכיוו הנכו, בעיקרו, פרופ' רובינסו מוצא את ההצעה.בעניינה
 להסתמכותה,בעיקר בכל הנוגע להסתמכותה על הגמול כעיקרו המנחה לענישה
על עונשי מוצא אשר יותאמו למקרי ספציפיי בהתייחס לרשימת נסיבות מקלות
.ומחמירות ולהצעתה למנות ועדת מומחי לקביעת עונשי מוצא
In this essay, Professor Robinson supports the current proposal for structuring
judicial discretion in sentencing, in particular its reliance upon desert as the
guiding principle for the distribution of punishment, its reliance upon
benchmarks, or “starting-points,” to be adjusted in individual cases by
reference to articulated mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and the
proposal’s suggestion to use an expert committee to draft the original
guidelines.

A. Desert as the Distributive Principle for Punishment; B. Deviations
from Desert; 1. Method of Punishment. 2. Rehabilitation. 3. Incapacitation
of the Dangerous; C. Guiding Judicial Discretion through the
Articulation of “Starting Points” Adjusted by Mitigating and Aggravating
Factors; D. Sentencing Guideline Drafting Committee; E. Conclusion.

_____________________________________
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I support the current proposal for structuring judicial discretion in sentencing,1 in
particular its reliance upon desert as the principle for guiding the distribution of
punishment,2 its reliance upon benchmarks, or “starting points,” to be adjusted in
individual cases by reference to articulated mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, and its use of an expert committee to draft the original guidelines.

A. Desert as the Distributive Principle for Punishment
Most American criminal codes are based upon the American Law Institute’s
Model Penal Code. For the first time in the forty-eight years since its promulgation
in 1962, the Model Code has been amended: desert has been adopted as the primary
principle for determining sentences.3 This is a dramatic shift from the previous
draft’s enthusiastic commitment to the traditional utilitarian distributive principles of
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.4
The turnabout comes not only from the virtues of a criminal sentencing system
that imposes just sentences – that is, a sentence based upon the offender’s moral
blameworthiness, no more and no less – but also from a growing recognition of the
weaknesses and limitations of the traditional mechanisms of coercive crime control.
As for deterrence as a distributive principle, a deterrent effect already inherent in
a just sentence, and a distribution of punishment designed to provide greater
deterrence can do so only by deviating from a just sentence – that is, by either doing
injustice (giving more punishment than is deserved) or by failing to do justice
_____________________________________
1

2
3
4

Proposal for Penal Law (Amendment No. 92) (Structuring Judicial Discretion in
Sentencing), 5756-2006, Governmental H.H. 446 (hereinafter: The Proposal). English
translation at Miriam Gur-Arye et al., Position Paper on the Proposal for Penal Law
(Amendment 92 – Structuring Judicial Discretion in Sentencing), 5756-2006, 18 (Daniel
Ohana trans., 2006); Daniel Ohana, Sentencing Reform in Israel: The Goldberg
Committee Report, 32 ISR. L. REV. 591, 625-643 (1998).
The desert as a distributive principle for punishment was offered in clause 40(b) of the
Proposal.
Model Penal Code § 1.02 (Amendment adopted May 16, 2007).
Cf. Model Penal Code § 1.02 (Official Draft, 1962).
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(giving less punishment than is deserved). And even if one were to suffer these
deviations from justice, current evidence suggest that while deterrence may work
under the right conditions, these conditions may be the exception rather than the
rule.5
As for rehabilitation, while it may be an ideal correctional policy – we ought to
try to rehabilitate every offender, for their sake and ours – it does not follow that
rehabilitation is a good principle for determining the distribution of criminal liability
and punishment. As with deterrence, a just distribution of punishment – according to
the offender’s blameworthiness, no more and no less – provides an opportunity to
rehabilitate, which ought to be eagerly seized. But to have the needs of rehabilitation
determine the sentence virtually assures injustice and failures of justice (If that were
the case, career criminals deemed to be without rehabilitative hope might go
unpunished). Suffering this injustice is a particularly bad trade-off given that
rehabilitation is effective only occasionally and, even then, commonly generates
only modest crime-control effects.6
In contrast to deterrence and rehabilitation, incapacitation of the dangerous
individual does clearly work. Imprisoning dangerous persons prevents victimization,
at least against victims outside the prison. However, such preventive detention can
generally be achieved more fairly and effectively, and with fewer detrimental effects
on detainees and the society, when done through a civil preventive detention
mechanism outside of the criminal justice system that does not pretend to be in the
business of punishing for past offenses.7
If the justification for the detention is fear of a possible future offense rather than
punishment for a past offense, then the criterion for detention ought to be strictly
_____________________________________
5

6
7

See PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO SHOULD BE
PUNISHED HOW MUCH? ch. 3 §§ A&B, ch. 4 § B (2008) (hereinafter: ROBINSON,
DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law
Deter? A Behavioural Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (2004);
Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of
Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949 (2003).
See ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at ch. 5.
Ibid, at ch. 6 § D; Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive
Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429 (2001).
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future dangerousness. Detention ought to be continually re-justified by a showing of
continual dangerousness. Detainees ought to have a right to treatment, and detention
conditions should be non-punitive. The reliability of the prediction of dangerousness
and the seriousness of the predicted offense ought to meet certain defined minimum
levels.
Such a system would be dramatically different from the existing criminal justice
system which, by own its terms, presents itself as doing justice for past crimes. If it
remains a system of “criminal justice” for past offenses, it will necessarily do a poor
job at preventive detention, resulting in both unfairness to detainees and
ineffectiveness in protecting society. A desert distribution of punishment provides
some incapacitating effect. If the control already inherent in a just sentence proves
insufficient for protecting society in an individual case, then detention past the term
of just punishment ought to permitted only if it can be openly justified on purely
preventive detention grounds.
The turn to desert may also reflect a growing recognition that doing justice is an
attractive distributive principle not only because it does justice, with the associated
deontological virtues, but also because by gaining a reputation for doing justice in
the eyes of the community, the system enhances its instrumentalist crime-control
potential. As I have argued elsewhere,8 earning a reputation for doing justice
increases the law’s moral credibility and thereby harnesses crime-control powers of
social and normative influence. Deviating from desert undermines the criminal
justice system’s moral credibility and thereby undermines its crime-control
effectiveness. Specifically, it undermines its power of stigmatization; increases the
chances of vigilantism; promotes resistance and subversion rather than the
cooperation and acquiescence that the criminal justice system requires; undermines
compliance in borderline cases where the condemnatory nature of the offense may
_____________________________________
8

See, e.g. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at ch. 8 and 12; Paul H.
Robinson & John Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal Law and
Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2007); Paul H. Robinson & John Darley, The
Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453 (1997); Paul H. Robinson, Geoffrey P.
Goodwin & Michael Reisig, The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940 (2010).

8
5/17/2011 10:43:00 AM z:\books\mishpatim\hukim\3\2010-12-22\01-robinson.doc

Comments on Proposal for Structuring Judicial Discretion in Sentencing

2011 חוקי ג

be ambiguous; and reduces the criminal justice system’s influence in the public
discourse, which forms societal norms.9
Of course, the community’s view of justice – “empirical desert,” as it has been
called – is not the same as true desert in a transcendent sense or, as moral
philosophers might prefer, “deontological desert.” However, given the practical
problems with activating deontological desert, empirical desert may be the best
approximation that retributivists can hope to achieve. More importantly, many if not
most modern moral philosophers appear to believe that there is little meaningful
difference between the two.10 While one may conclude that desert should be the
primary principle for distributing punishment, it does not follow that there never
ought to be an exception to the principle. The new Model Penal Code “purposes”
section does indeed enshrine desert as the first principle, never to be violated.
However, my own view is that there may be justifications for deviating from desert,
within limits. Doing justice is an important interest, but it is not the only interest
While one may conclude that desert should be the primary principle for
distributing punishment, it does not follow that there ought never be an exception to
the principle. The new Model Penal Code “purposes” section does indeed enshrine
desert as the first principle, never to be violated. However, my own view is that there
may be justifications for deviating from desert, within limits. Doing justice is an
important interest, but it is not the only interest.

B. Deviations from Desert
The Proposal expressly authorizes deviations from desert to promote
rehabilitation or to protect public safety.11 Elsewhere I consider a range of other
_____________________________________
9

10
11

It is also suggested that such deviation might undermine the main purpose of the bill –
diminution of the punishing gaps in courts. See in this edition: The Jerusalem Criminal
Justice Group, Position Paper on the Proposal for Penal Law (Amendment no. 92)
(Structuring Judicial Discretion in Sentencing), 2006, 3 HUKIM 19 (2011).
Compare in this edition: Leslie Sebba, Sentencing Scales in Search of a Principle, 3
HUKIM 99 (2011).
Ohana, supra note 1, at 625-26 (§ 3). According to clause 40(G) of the Proposal, the
court might also consider other circumstances as justifying deviation from desert.
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justifications for deviation,12 but let me focus here on these two deviations
supported by the Proposal. As a start, consider what desert does and does not
require. Some things that are authorized as deviations from desert may not be
deviations at all, and therefore ought not to require special authorization under a
properly construed desert principle.
1. Method of Punishment
The core of desert is to make sure that offenders with higher blameworthiness are
punished more than less blameworthy offenders.13 The focus is on the quantity of
punishment – primarily getting the relative relation among different cases right –
rather than upon the quality of punishment. This means that, as long as judges are
given guidance as to the amount of punishment to be imposed – the amount that will
put the offender at hand in his proper ordinal rank in relation to other offenders of
higher or lower blameworthiness – then judges can be given a good deal of
discretion in determining the method by which that deserved amount of punishment
is imposed, assuming they are similarly instructed as to the respective punitive
values assigned to different punishment methods.14
_____________________________________
12
13

14

For a fuller discussion of justified deviations from desert, see ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE
PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at 249-253.
Regarding the evolution of theories in creating ladders of blameworthiness see in details
in this edition: Sebba, supra note 11; Ladders of blameworthiness compel creating
ladders of punishments. That might seem problematic while determining the severity of
punishment methods which are not imprisonment. See in this edition: The Jerusalem
Criminal Justice Group, supra note 9.
For a general discussion, see PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT
JUSTICE: WHY CRIMINAL LAW DOESN’T GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE 213 (2005);
Paul H. Robinson, Desert, Crime Control, Disparity, and Units of Punishment, in PENAL
THEORY AND PRACTICE: TRADITION AND INNOVATION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 93 (A. Duff et
al. eds., 1994). Researchers have offered examples of such punitive-effect equivalency
tables. See, e.g. Robert E. Harlow, John M. Darley & Paul H. Robinson, The Severity of
Intermediate Penal Sanctions: A Psychophysical Scaling Approach for Obtaining
Community Perceptions, 11 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 71 (1995); Maynard L.
Erickson & Jack P. Gibbs, On the Perceived Severity of Legal Penalties, 70 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 102 (1979); Leslie Sebba, Some Explorations in the Scaling of
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2. Rehabilitation
Fully understanding the demands of desert is also important when considering
whether rehabilitation should be an authorized ground for deviating from desert. My
guess is that many, if not most people support a deviation from desert for
rehabilitation because they think it important to make available rehabilitation
programs such as drug treatment, education, and psychological counseling. As noted
above, however, a desert distributive principle in no way limits the use of such
programs. What it does say is that, after taking account of the intrusiveness,
restrictions, emotional and physical challenges, and other demands on the program
participants, the total “punitive bite” of the program ought to be the amount the
offender deserves – no more and no less. If participating in the rehabilitation
program produces less suffering than the punishment the offender deserves, than
additional punishment ought to be imposed in some other way, by some additional
punishment.
While rehabilitation programs commonly have limited success, and even then
only with limited kinds of offenders, some programs can indeed be effective in
reducing the chances of recidivism.15 Perhaps more importantly, many of these
programs are valuable for reasons other than crime control – such as in giving
offenders a greater chance of living up to their own human potential. That is,
rehabilitation can be an important value in itself, even if its crime-control benefits
are limited. For all of these reasons, rehabilitation ought to be a fundamental
correctional policy. Whenever the correctional system has an opportunity to do so, it
ought to provide the possibility of rehabilitation to offenders.
When it works, rehabilitation has value. However, it is important to distinguish
between the different roles rehabilitation can assume. Rehabilitation as a core
correctional policy is quite different from rehabilitation as a distributive principle for
punishment. We may well want to take every opportunity in the correctional system
to rehabilitate, but we may not want to determine the amount of punishment to be
_____________________________________

15

Penalties, 15 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQUENCY 247 (1978); Leslie Sebba & Gad Nathan,
Further Exploration in the Scaling of Penalties, 22 BRITISH J. CRIMINOLOGY 221 (1984).
See ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 102, 104-106.
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imposed based upon the possibility of rehabilitation. If a program exists that will
benefit an offender, then he ought to participate in it. But it does not logically follow
that that program ought to become the sole punishment for his offense. Such a
principle – tying the length of imprisonment, for example, to the length of the
rehabilitation program –disconnects punishment from moral blameworthiness so as
to make the system seriously conflict with desert with no apparent gain.
One last note regarding rehabilitation is in order. To the extent that people
believe that a deviation from desert for rehabilitation is required in order to authorize
lesser punishment for first-time, young offenders, I suggest that the concern is
misguided and the exception unnecessary. If properly applied, desert as a distributive
principle fully accounts for all matters that shape an offender’s moral
blameworthiness, and therefore ought to take account of the youthfulness of an
offender (and the lack of a prior criminal record – see below). That is, a distributive
desert principle by itself would demand a lesser punishment for a youthful offender
if, for example, his age suggests an as yet undeveloped or underdeveloped
appreciation of societal norms and one’s obligation to follow them, an incapacity or
as yet undeveloped capacity to control impulsiveness, or some other mitigating
circumstance. Peoples’ intuitions that youthful offenders ought to receive less
punishment are a reflection of desert rather than a deviation from it. Authorizing
still further mitigation – even below the lower punishment than this desert-based
mitigation would provide – would undermine the criminal law’s moral credibility,
and would thereby impair the mechanisms of crime control through normative
influence, as described above. The point is not that rehabilitation is somehow part of
desert; it is most certainly not. Rather, the point is that, if a judge conscientiously
assesses the blameworthiness of a youthful offender, the amount of punishment
deserved may be considerably lower than the amount that would be deserved by an
adult committing the same offense. And this conclusion follows without any
reference whatever to a need for or the potential for rehabilitation. My own view is
that rehabilitation ought to be pursued at every opportunity, but only within the
confines of the deserved punishment, no more, no less.
3. Incapacitation of the Dangerous
I am also sympathetic to the importance of protecting public safety – the other
ground for deviating from desert contained in the Proposal. Again, however, it is not
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clear to me that the best means of protecting public safety is to invite deviations
from desert in setting criminal sentences. A sentence based upon deserved
punishment can provide a significant opportunity to control and monitor an
offender’s future conduct, thereby providing incapacitation if it is thought to be
needed. Indeed, without deviating from desert, a judge may structure the method of
punishment in the way that most effectively protects society from the danger of a
future offense (For example, instead of three years in prison, a judge might impose a
sentence of equal punitiveness that involves house arrest but with a much longer
period of monitoring and control, including an ankle bracelet, a curfew, limitations
on personal associations and activities, and other such control measures).
Imposing greater punishment than deserved in order to provide additional
incapacitation only assures injustice.16 And the resulting perception of unjustness of
the system undermines its moral credibility and thereby its crime-control
effectiveness, in ways that may well outweigh the crime-control gains realized by
the deviation. At the very least, I would urge that such deviations from desert for
preventive purposes be used sparingly and in ways that minimize the deviation.17
As I have argued above and elsewhere,18 both society and detainees would be
better off if, instead of being cloaked as punishment for a past offense, such
preventive detention was done openly through a civil commitment system that
attracts the scrutiny that such preventive detention merits, including an examination
of such questions as: What is the reliability of the prediction of future
dangerousness? (Evidence suggests our current predictive accuracy is poor.) What is
the rate of false positives in such predictions? What minimum future danger is
required to justify what length of preventive detention? How frequently must the
continuing dangerousness of the detainee be demonstrated? All of these critical
_____________________________________
16
17

18

See Robinson, Goodwin & Reisig, supra note 8.
It is also suggested in this edition that such deviation, which try to foresee the
capacitation of the (future) dangerous, contradicts the Israeli Basic Law: Human Dignity
and Liberty. See The Jerusalem Criminal Justice Group, supra note 9.
See ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at ch. 6, § D; Robinson,
Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, supra
note 7.
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questions are short-circuited when preventive detention is cloaked as criminal
justice.

B. Guiding Judicial Discretion through the Articulation of “Starting
Points” Adjusted by Mitigating and Aggravating Factors
The Proposal sets a useful middle course in the means by which judicial
sentencing discretion is to be guided.19 It provides a good deal of details toward
constructing specific sentences – not just general principles – but does not bind
judges to fixed sentences.20 The proposed scheme retains a good deal of flexibility
for the sentencing judge, but does mandate that the judge consider all the factors set
out in the guidelines as being relevant to punishment.
This strikes me as a fine compromise, at least for a first set of guidelines.
Understandably, Judges will have reservations given the lack of evidence as to the
reliability and sophistication of the guidelines they are asked to follow. Over time, if
the guidelines earn themselves a reputation of being well thought out and accurate in
their assessments, one might consider a path of increased guidance. But to leave the
guidelines entirely general and toothless risks conditioning judges to ignore them,
and this is not likely to provide a foundation upon which a more reliable and
sophisticated set of guidelines can be built.
Key to understanding the need for some, albeit modest intrusion upon judicial
sentencing discretion is an appreciation for the root causes of improper sentencing
disparity and the serious unfairness it produces. To the extent that different judges
come to different factual conclusions about the same case, there is nothing that a
sentencing system can do to avoid the problem, other than to give judges greater
special education and experience. The real targets of sentencing guidelines are those
disparities in the treatment of similar cases that arise from the differences among
_____________________________________
19
20

Ohana, supra note 1, at 630-631, § 11.
It would be useful if the Sentencing Guidelines Committee was authorized to expand
upon the list of relevant factors and their articulation.
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judges’ sentencing philosophies, by which I mean the principles by which they
distribute punishment.
It is quite natural for judges to disagree among themselves about these principles,
just as scholars and policymakers do. Different philosophies, of course, will generate
different sentences for identical cases. I have described above the growing scholarly
consensus in the United States in support of desert as a distributive principle, but
clearly there remain many dissenters. It should be no surprise that judges will
disagree among themselves about such matters, but it is unconscionable that an
offender will have his punishment determined by the sheer chance of the sentencing
judge they are assigned.
A society may well have to tolerate the inevitable differences in fact-finding
among different judges, but it need not and ought not to tolerate the application of
different punishment philosophies to different offenders, and without guidelines to
articulate a single set of principles for all judges, the problem of conflicting
principles among judges cannot begin to be solved.21

D. Sentencing Guideline Drafting Committee22
The proposal envisions the creation of a committee to draft the initial set of
guidelines, whose members have some expertise in the area and represent a variety
of interested constituencies. I think this approach has some significant advantage
over leaving the project to normal legislative processes. The guidelines-drafting
process requires expertise in criminal law and theory and a level of detail in research
and drafting well beyond what reasonably could be expected of legislators. The use
of the 'committee approach' is likely to produce not only a better informed set of
guidelines but also to somewhat insulate the process from the predictable and oft_____________________________________
21
22

Yet, it remains unclear to several Israeli scholars whether the Proposal shall lead to
smaller punishment gaps. See The Jerusalem Criminal Justice Group, supra note 9.
It is suggested by some that setting sentencing guidelines by a drafting committee might
be considered illegal. For this claim See The Jerusalem Criminal Justice Group, supra
note 9.
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times irrational pressures of crime legislation politics (Indeed, I would further urge
that the standing committee be created to serve as a continuing overseer of the
guidelines).
My support of the 'committee approach' derives from several decades of working
with legislatures both in the United States and overseas in reforming their criminal
laws. While I very much believe in the value of the legislative process as a means of
expressing the democratic will, anyone involved in it knows that traditional political
processes have some important limitations that ought not to be ignored.
First, crime legislation in particular seems to be susceptible to an unhealthy
dynamic. Here I may be simply projecting the problems common in the United
States, which may or may not exist in Israel. In the U.S. crime legislation process, it
is common to hear thoughtful and responsible legislators say they are going to vote
for a crime bill that they think is unwise and perhaps even dangerous. They see
themselves as having no choice because the failure to vote for the legislation leaves
them vulnerable, in the next election, to attacks claiming that the legislator is “soft
on crime.” It only takes one ambitious legislator looking for a headline to maneuver
his colleagues into a bad piece of legislation that no one really wants.
Second, when it comes to crime legislation, the political process often responds
ad hoc to some situation or event in the recent headlines.23 This tendency to focus
on the crime-de-jour has serious long-term complications. Because the legislation is
passed when people are worked up about the crime at hand, it tends to exaggerate the
seriousness of the crime in relation to other offenses. Over time, the improper
_____________________________________
23

A famous example of this is the “Lindbergh Law”, which made kidnapping a federal
offense in the wake of the taking of Charles Lindbergh’s infant son from the famous
U.S. aviator’s house. See M. Todd Scott, Comment, Kidnapping Federalism: United
States v. Wills and the Constitutionality of Extending Federal Criminal Law Into the
States, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 753 (2003) (describing the kidnapping and
subsequent legislation). Another famous criminal law passed immediately after a
prominent crime is “Megan’s Law”, establishing the nation’s first modern sex offender
registration and notification requirement. See Corey R. Young, One of These Laws is
Not Like the Others: Why the Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
Raises New Constitutional Questions, 46 HARV J. ON LEGIS. 369, 372 (2009) (examining
the impetus behind passage of the law).
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grading of offenses may become apparent, but there is little political motivation to
reduce a penalty. Indeed, the out-of-line penalty only serves to increase the
likelihood that the next crime-de-jour will be subject to a penalty that is even more
out of line, as its sponsors use the most recent legislation as their point of
comparison and want to exceed that point in order to express their serious concern
about the new crime. The simple fact is that, when the legislature enacts laws
covering individual crimes, it rarely, if ever, stops to realistically assess how the
crime at hand properly fits into the larger scheme of existing offenses and their
relative penalties.
The legislative tendency toward ill-conceived crime legislation generally and the
crime-de-jour problem in particular is probably too strong to be blocked, I fear.
However, it is realistic to assume that a standing sentencing guideline committee
could compensate for the structural weakness. That is, it could do the careful
assessment of the relative seriousness of offenses, including new offenses, and set
the “start point” for each according to its relative seriousness. The guidelines must
defer to all legislative directions, of course; the committee can only provide
guidance within the limits that the legislature has set, and judges will be free to
deviate from the guidelines’ starting point, of course. However, the guidelines could
at least provide a set of “starting points” that sets each offense or sub-offense in
proper relation to all other offenses and that instructs judges to take account of the
full range of factors that can be relevant to desert.

E. Conclusion
The proposal takes up an important area in which many reformers, in my view,
have gotten things seriously wrong. It is a pleasant surprise, then, to see such a
thoughtful and reasonable approach to the complex problems of irrationality and
unjustifiable disparity in sentencing. The proposal’s recognition of desert as the
guiding principle for the distribution of punishment, its use of specific yet flexible
guidelines for the exercise of judicial discretion, coupled with the creation of a
commission to develop and update the guidelines as needed, seems likely to move
the criminal justice system toward greater justice and effectiveness.
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C OMMENTS ON P ROPOSAL FOR S TRUCTURING J UDICIAL
D ISCRETION IN S ENTENCING
P AUL H. R OBINSON
In this essay, Professor Robinson supports the current proposal for structuring
judicial discretion in sentencing, in particular its reliance upon desert as the guiding
principle for the distribution of punishment, its reliance upon benchmarks, or
“starting-points,” to be adjusted in individual cases by reference to articulated
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and the proposal’s suggestion to use of
an expert committee to draft the original guidelines.
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